tssci security

Weaponizing Noam Chomsky

I wanted to ask Dan Kaminsky, who btw is a brilliant presenter (more below), about doing grammar and writing style analysis to determine who wrote a paper. I can see the techniques as potentially having forensic uses. Don't ask me what his talk was about, I would not be able to recall any useful details. Here is what his talk description stated:

Weaponizing Noam Chomsky, or Hacking with Pattern Languages There is no man page for the English language, but kids pick it up anyway (more or less). There is deep structure hidden inside every human generated language, especially those we intend to fuzz. I will discuss and demonstrate new, useful, and purty purty tools for rendering complex patterns automatically, potentially in realtime, and breaking things with it. New toys will be released, including a generic XML fuzzer (rawk!).

This was my first time seeing Dan talk and it was very entertaining and surprising to watch him react and respond to questions from the audience. No matter how annoying or frequently the questions came, he was quick on his feet(even after drinking four beers) to counter-attack.

ShmooCon 2007 - Lab Day 1

We got our NOC up and running. Critical services have been set up for the most part, and we'll be doing some tuning today. Not new to us all, things don't always work the way you want, so that's what we're currently going through today. To anyone here at the con, don't login to any services over clear text, and try and use pub certs wherever possible. If in doubt, just remember that we are at a security con, and we're doing full packet dumps.. just a friendly reminder.

I'll be hitting up the NoVaSec meeting with Landon from Digital Bond and also the pod/vid casters meetup at room362. So, if you're in town, feel free to meet us there. I've been having a great time at ShmooCon so far, and everyone I met has been really cool.

Phoenix catalyst meetup, ShmooCon

Tonight I had a great time hanging out with Michael Santarcangelo of Security Catalyst, Andre Gironda, Erich Newell and Adam Muntner. There were a bunch of other guys (and Grace!) there, but I apologize for not remembering your names. It was fun talking though! Gotta watch out for that one dude's company who has had a bunch of weird deaths like cancer and dead people lying in their house for a week at a time... LOL

Anyways, I'm getting ready to go to ShmooCon/Labs out in Washington D.C. this week(end). I look forward to meeting Richard Bejtlich and attending the NoVaSec meeting, Landon from Digital Bond and Martin McKeay. If you wanna meet up - post a comment here/send me an email/or call my cell phone. Also,try and make it to the ShmooCon meetup in Room362. I will also be playing tourist with my buddy Daniel, the security admin at our school, UAT. We'll try and check out the International Spy Museum and also the Smithsonian National Air & Space Museum.

I cannot wait, this conference is going to be awesome. See you guys there.

Incompetent blurring

While chatting in #snort-gui today, somebody noticed Gizmodo was showing off their ticket to Apple NAB. You can see they blurred the Name, Company and barcode on the ticket. Whoever did this, did a poor job because they didn't blur the name on the right-hand side.. What was the point of blurring it? Not to mention, some reported seeing the barcode show up crystal clear in their rss reader. Quick check on the image location and it linked to http://gizmodo.com/assets/resources/2007/03/nab_appleevent2.jpg.

Like anyone would, I deleted the '2' from the image file name and checked out what the image was. Sure enough, the image showed up with the barcode in the clear.

They fixed the problem, but not before a couple of us snagged a copy.

Are we taking vulnerabilities less seriously?

The OpenBSD IPv6 Remote DoS vulnerability has striked debate and strong reaction on whether denial-of-service is a security vulnerability or not. Let's go back to the fundamentals we all learned early on: C-I-A, Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. We can have the most secure systems in the world by disconnecting them from everything and making them unavailable, both on the internet and physically. What good does this do for us?

Some may not see a DoS as serious as say remote execution or privilege escalation, but in many industries, availability is more important than confidentiality or integrity. What happens when medical systems are unavailable, or an online store's web site goes down? Availability of the systems is just as important as the confidentiality and integrity, and for us to think of availability as some luxury we can do without... makes having confidentiality and integrity pretty pointless.

Michael Howard posted his thoughts on judging Windows Vista security which has received criticism from Slashdot, ComputerWorld and MSRC stated it will not change how it rates vulnerabilities because of underlying technology. Lowering the criticality of a vulnerability because of some preventative technique in use, is a bad idea in my opinion. Richard Bejtlich stresses the fact, and Joanna Rutkowska stated it in her recent Dark Reading interview, "prevention eventually fails." These technologies in Vista supposed to prevent such vulnerabilities from happening, will eventually be exploited. The question then becomes, what do we do next? Let's not play the semantics game and just stick to fixing the issues in a timely manner.

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